

The University of Chicago

ENGLAND, GERMANY, AND THE
TRANSVAAL, 1895-1902

A PART OF A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO
THE FACULTY OF THE DIVISION OF THE
SOCIAL SCIENCES IN CANDIDACY FOR THE
DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY

1935

By

CORNELIUS D. PENNER

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INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this dissertation is to ascertain the extent of German interests in the Transvaal, to note the relations between the governments at Berlin and Pretoria and their effect on the diplomatic relations between England and Germany. An attempt is also made to show how the rival aims of the two countries in the South African Republic, and the crises arising therefrom, unleashed furious press campaigns which presaged ill for the future.

The most important source that has been used in preparation for this thesis is the collection of German documents, Die Grosse Politik der Europäischen Kabinette 1871-1914. The first volume of the British Documents on the Origins of the War 1898-1914 has been used to great advantage, though the collection pertaining to this topic is not nearly so complete as that of the Grosse Politik. The Parliamentary Papers have much valuable material for the first chapter and supplemented in certain instances the British Documents on the Origins of the War. Hansard's Parliamentary Debates, and the German counterpart, the Stenographische Berichte, have been used. The Deutsches Handels-Archiv also yielded considerable material on German interests in South Africa, as did also the periodical Export. The London Times is the best source for public opinion in England. In the absence of sufficient German newspapers, many references to German public opinion were obtained from the reports of the Times correspondent at Berlin. Considerable material has also been obtained from the Allgemeine Zeitung, the Kolonialzeitung, the Grenzboten, Preussische Jahrbücher, Deutsche Revue, and the Deutsche Rundschau. A large number of articles in English periodicals has been used. Memoirs and biographies were employed. The most important of these are Prince von Bülow's Denkwürdigkeiten, and J. L. Garvin's Life of Chamberlain.

CHAPTER I

GERMANY AND THE TRANSVAAL BEFORE 1896

German activities in South Africa centered in the Transvaal. These activities fall into two categories: the territorial aspirations of Germany and the economic penetration of the Boer Republic. The impetus that unification, in 1871, had given to German industry and commerce induced German merchants and traders to look for profitable markets. South Africa was soon discovered to offer the necessary advantages to trade and to emigration to take care of Germany's surplus population. It was the hope of German imperialists to create a second German Empire in South Africa, a second India under German control. Foremost among the agitators for the realization of such a grandiose scheme was Ernst von Weber, a German mine owner in South Africa and a frequent sojourner there.

During the first decade after unification, Bismarck discountenanced every solicitation for government support to carry out these ideals. He declared that Germany was a saturated state and had enough domestic troubles without inviting more by launching out on a policy of expansion. However, towards the end of the seventies he became more amenable to the pressure of the colonials and held out hopes for future support by the Imperial Government. In 1883, through the activities of Lüderitz, a merchant of Bremen, Angra Pequena was obtained, and this acquisition paved the way for attempts to reach the South African Republic. It was thought that the Boers, distant kinsmen of the Germans, would offer an excellent opportunity for co-operation in settling the regions north and west of the South African Republic. An attempt to establish direct communications with the Boers was made immediately after Angra Pequena had been acquired. However, the British Government, suddenly aroused to the danger of German expansion, annexed Bechuanaland, the territory intervening between the South African Republic and Angra Pequena. While the German danger was by no means the only reason which induced the British Government to act, it is certain that it was a contributing factor. The annexation prevented the realization of German aims.

Another attempt was made in 1884 to reach the Boers from Santa Lucia Bay. In November of this year Lüderitz, through his agents Einwald and Schiel, had obtained important concessions

from Dinizulu, king of the Zulus. The grant gave Lüderitz 60,000 acres of land, permission to construct a railroad from Santa Lucia to the Transvaal, and colonization privileges for German immigrants extending one mile on either side of the bay. If this concession had stood, the dream of German colonials might very well have come true. Bismarck himself was not unfavorable to the project. If England did not wish to lose its hegemony in South Africa it had to prevent Santa Lucia from falling into German hands.

The German challenge revived half-forgotten English claims based on an old treaty made in 1843 with Panda, then king of the Zulus, by which he had ceded Santa Lucia to England. But England had never attempted any settlements, and through long inactivity its claims appeared weak. In addition, Sir Bartle Frere, Governor of Cape Colony, asserted that Panda had no land to give away there, and Sir Theophilus Shepstone, who effected the first annexation of the Transvaal in 1877, said that the Zulu king had become a feudatory of the Boers three years previous to the signing of the treaty in question. But the German counter-claim now induced English authorities to invoke this half-forgotten document in the absence of better claims. England had not yet recognized Dinizulu as king of the Zulus, for he was the Boer candidate for that position. His minority was another argument against the validity of his concession to Lüderitz. To make good its claims the British Government dispatched H.M.S. Goschawk to the disputed harbor and on December 21, 1884, Sir Henry Bulwer, Governor of Natal, was able to inform the government at London that the British flag was flying over Santa Lucia Bay.

This precipitate action on the part of the British Government met with opposition from Germany. It was pointed out that the British flag had no legal right to be at Santa Lucia. Bismarck lodged a complaint at London. He averred that it was pure mockery to unearth "old decrepit claims" according to Portuguese methods. To come to a definite understanding with the British Government in regard to Santa Lucia and other colonial disputes, Bismarck sent his son Herbert, who had done yeoman service in a previous similar incident, to London. The members of the cabinet were very approachable, but adamant in regard to Santa Lucia Bay. Lord Rosebery, a prominent liberal leader and at this time Lord Privy Seal, because of his shrewdness and thorough knowledge of

South Africa was more than a match for the chancellor's son, who might have been well advised to take lessons in geography before proceeding to London on such an important mission. He failed signally.

The incident was terminated by a settlement of all outstanding colonial differences in Africa between England and Germany. The latter agreed to withdraw her protest to the hoisting of the British flag at Santa Lucia Bay and agreed to refrain from acquiring territories or establishing protectorates on the coast between Natal and Delagoa Bay. In return, Germany was accorded important concessions on the coast of the Gulf of Guinea.

After the Germans had failed to secure a foothold at Santa Lucia, Delagoa Bay in Portuguese Mozambique presented the best opportunity to obtain a non-English port for purposes of establishing direct communications with the Transvaal. German investors were eager to purchase the newly constructed railroad from Delagoa Bay to the Republic. If this had materialized British hegemony in South Africa would have been seriously threatened. To prevent any such eventuality Cecil Rhodes, the Cape Premier, had hoped to purchase all of Mozambique. However, due to the inactivity of the home government, the plan came to naught. But in 1891 Great Britain obtained pre-emptive rights to Delagoa Bay and by this prevented the port from falling into German hands. Great Britain, by a series of annexations and the agreement with Portugal over Delagoa Bay, had shut the Boers in and the Germans out.

The commercial relations between Germany and the South African Republic were based on the treaty of commerce and friendship of 1885. Following this date Germans elbowed themselves into favor with the Boer President and the Raad and obtained numerous concessions, the most important of which were the Transvaal railroad system and the dynamite concession. The Transvaal Government shared with the German investors the profit accruing from these monopolies to the disadvantage of the British in the Republic. It was charged by Englishmen that the policy of the Boer Government in regard to the Germans was discriminatory against British subjects, and this was a violation of Article XIII of the London Convention of 1884, which had settled the relations between England and the South African Republic. In the parliamentary investigation following the Jameson Raid, Cecil Rhodes testified that the dynamite monopoly, held by the German, Eduard

Lippert, cost the Rand capitalists £600,000 per annum. The Transvaal railroad system, controlled by German and Dutch capital, also was used to discriminate against the British railroads. Contrary to an agreement between Rhodes and Kruger, the latter raised the rates from 1 d, the stipulated rate, to 1 s per ton-mile on goods shipped through the southern British ports, and carried by British railroads to the Transvaal boundary. Moreover, preferential rates were accorded to German merchants who shipped through Delagoa Bay. When trade continued to flow south despite this vigorous and illegal procedure, the government at Pretoria ordered the fords of the Vaal river closed, for to evade the regulations, goods were carted by waggon from the boundary to Johannesburg. This action evoked an ultimatum from London and the Boer Government retreated.

These two monopolies are representative of a large number of similar favors bestowed on German concession hunters. Waterworks, brickworks, collieries--all brought grist to the mill, and the Germans were the favored millers. They were as thorns in the sides of the ambitious British imperialists, who deprecated the alliance between German industrialists and the Boer Government for purposes of stalling that economic federation which Rhodes was advocating in the hope that it would lead to political federation. This close co-operation brought enormous profits to the grantor and the grantees at the expense of English investors, and at the same time bolstered Boer opposition and fostered German arrogance. Things came to such a pass that Cecil Rhodes declared that the British scheme of economic federation in South Africa was seriously compromised by German machinations. For this reason he supported a contemplated Uitlander rising in Johannesburg, which envisaged the overthrow of the corrupt Boer Government at Pretoria. However, the intended rising did not take place. It was to have been supported by Jameson, who had collected a force on the Transvaal boundary. The German Government suspected, probably not without reason, the British Government's tacit consent to Rhodes' scheme, though it was not informed of Jameson's intentions.

In reconsidering German policy in South Africa before 1896, it may be pointed out again that the Transvaal was the pivot of its imperialistic pretensions. Attempts to secure a foothold in Bechuanaland, at Santa Lucia Bay and at Delagoa Bay,

for purposes of establishing direct communications with the Boers of the Transvaal, all failed. However, the economic penetration of the South African Republic by the Germans was more successful and was a real threat to British hegemony. By working hand in hand with the government at Pretoria they were able to secure one important monopoly after another, oppressing the country by their exorbitant charges. The Uitlanders, most of whom were British subjects, suffered the most under this situation. Pretoria and the Wilhelmstrasse joined in obstructing the grant of a more liberal franchise to the Uitlanders, thus destroying all hope of reforming the corrupt government in the Transvaal. The economic strength of the Germans in the Republic, together with German diplomatic support of the Boer Government made Rhodes' plan of economic federation practically impossible. The desperate situation impelled British imperialists in South Africa to find a remedy by resorting to force. The effect of the ill-starred venture by Dr. Jameson on Anglo-German relations forms the topic for the next chapter.

CHAPTER II

THE REPERCUSSIONS OF THE JAMESON RAID ON ANGLO-GERMAN RELATIONS

Beginning with December 24, 1895, alarming news from Herff, the German consul at Pretoria, and from the German population of the same place, flooded Germany. The English element of the Uitlanders was organizing a revolt while the Boer Government prepared preventive measures. Dr. Jameson, at the head of 800 troopers, was approaching Johannesburg to assist the rebels. A conflict seemed imminent. President Kruger considered Jameson's act a breach of the London Convention and now hoped to capitalize the often-professed friendship between German and Boer. The Wilhelmstrasse, too, seemed willing to throw its weight on the side of the South African Republic when Baron von Marschall, the German foreign secretary, lodged a complaint with Sir Frank Lascelles, the British ambassador at Berlin. Germany demanded the status quo in South Africa as stipulated by the London Convention. A disregard of this treaty would seriously compromise German vested interests. The only alternative to an armed conflict between Boer and Chartered Company troops, predicted the London Times,

would be the annexation of the Transvaal by Britain. This would be unacceptable to Germany, and Marschall considered it the duty of the British Imperial Government to forestall such an eventuality. But German authorities feared that that was exactly what the cabinet at London did not wish to do. It was thought in Berlin that the revolt of the Uitlanders, if not actively promoted from London, was at least clandestinely suffered to run its course. Against foreign intervention, the German secretary thought, England depended on the antagonism between the Triple and Dual Alliances. In regard to this, Marschall warned Lascelles, London should be under no illusion. The tension between the alliance systems had eased considerably under the influence of British provocations, and the differences between France and Germany had almost disappeared. The implication, of course, was that if England should continue its provocative policy in South Africa a continental grouping of the Powers might check her ambitions. This was certainly an overstatement of the case. It is true that England and Russia eyed each other with suspicion in the Far East, and that England and France had their serious differences over Egypt. Furthermore, in 1894, France and Germany had co-operated against English pretensions in the Congo region. However, all this did not assure united action against England in 1896.

While Berlin was issuing instructions to London, and the garrulous German editors were fulminating against the advance of Jameson and the corrupt British Government, Kruger's forces scored a decisive victory over Jameson's freebooters. The morning following, January 3, 1896, there was great excitement and the wildest scheming at Berlin. The Kaiser and his immediate advisors, the Imperial Chancellor Hohenlohe, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs Marschall, Admirals Hollmann, Knorr and Senden, met to determine what course the government should follow in regard to the new development in the Transvaal. The Kaiser seems to have lost all sense of proportion relative to the proper attitude that his government should pursue. He suggested a German protectorate over the South African Republic, similar to the one established by Britain by the London Convention of 1884. He wished, further, to mobilize the marine corps and send troops to the South African Republic. The chancellor remonstrated that that would mean war. "Ja," replied the Kaiser, "aber nur zu Land."

It is impossible to follow this line of reasoning without recognizing the Kaiser's incompetence to steer a purposeful course. How could he limit England to land action when once the war had begun? Further, it seems he intended to transport his troops while England was undisputed mistress of the seas. It is clear that this was a hare-brained suggestion and his advisors were sagacious enough to dissuade him from such an attempt. But the Kaiser's urge for action had to be satisfied. Accordingly, Marschall suggested a congratulatory telegram to President Kruger upon his success. The original draft of the telegram was written by the Kaiser himself, and according to Marschall was much more provocative than the one that was finally sent. Through the tempering influence of the others present at the meeting the following draft was devised which was then sent to the President of the South African Republic:

"Ich spreche Ihnen Meinen aufrichtigen Glückwunsch aus, dass es Ihnen, ohne an die Hülfe befreundeter Mächte zu appellieren, mit Ihrem Volke gelungen ist in eigener Tatkraft gegenüber den bewaffneten Scharen, welche als Friedensstörer in Ihr Land eingebrochen sind, den Frieden wiederherzustellen und die Unabhängigkeit des Landes gegen Angriffe von aussen zu wahren.

"Wilhelm I.R."

The Kruger Telegram was denounced in England as an arrogant interference on the part of the German Government in British domestic affairs. The Kaiser's reference to the "independence" of the Transvaal, and the implication that Germany would have responded to a call for help, excited English public opinion to fever heat. The Kaiser was roundly censured in the press and by private letters for his breach of diplomatic etiquette, and the British Government ordered out a flying squadron in order to be prepared for any emergency.

In Germany the Kruger Telegram was extolled as a feat worthy of the great Bismarckian era. The Kaiser reached the pinnacle of his popularity. Even Bismarck, the avowed opponent of the Neue Kurs, found nothing wrong with the message and declared that it would have been correct for the British Government to have sent a similar telegram to President Kruger. Indeed, many papers in Germany considered that the British anger resulting from the Kaiser's message to Kruger was a proof per se that the

government at London was implicated, for otherwise British ire would not have been aroused. The German people experienced a certain satisfaction for having administered perfidious Albion a lesson in diplomacy.

The considerations which induced the German Government to send the Kruger Telegram bear witness to the lack of vision of the authorities at the Wilhelmstrasse. Germany could not support the Boers against England with the latter in control of the seas. Yet that is what the Kaiser's message implied. It was bound to arouse English public opinion and at the same time was of no advantage to German interests in South Africa. Thus it proved to be a double loss. The hope that a policy of pin-pricks, of which the telegram was the most recent, would induce England to align with the Triple Alliance was erroneous in its inception, as later events proved. On the contrary, the British Government composed some of the outstanding differences between England and France while Berlin and London were wrangling over the Kruger Telegram.

One important result of the message to Kruger was that the Kaiser and his aids exploited the excitement in Germany to win support for a large navy, though the plans for a fleet had been drafted in 1895. Hohenlohe opposed the Kaiser's suggestion that the Reichstag be asked forthwith to vote a bond issue of 300,000,000 M. for a naval program. He declared that, in spite of the feeling against England, the party leaders in the Reichstag would refuse such a measure on the plea that their constituencies would not support it. Public opinion had to be educated to win support for the Kaiser's pet dream. Accordingly the recent Anglo-German altercation was used as an object lesson in German maritime impotence. The lesson was well taught, and in the following year there was sufficient support to carry the first naval law. The Transvaal crisis of 1896 was also responsible for Admiral Tirpitz's plan for a three front defense: against Russia, France and England. Hitherto England had not been considered a possible foe.

In conclusion, it may be pointed out again that the Anglo-German rivalry in the Transvaal had produced a most serious condition of affairs. Germany based the rightness of its course on the extent of its vested interests there, and on the plea that the South African Republic was in effect an independent state. Moreover, the Wilhelmstrasse posed as a guardian of international

law against unscrupulous England. On the other hand, England represented the provoking policy of Berlin in territory that was considered British. British suzerainty was not considered to have lapsed, though the Law Lords themselves had serious doubt about the correctness of this assertion. The Kaiser's telegram to Kruger and the attitude of the German press only tended to strain a situation already fraught with danger. After a fortnight of charges and countercharges there came a lull in the press war, though this first serious Anglo-German quarrel remained an open sore for several years.

CHAPTER III THE INTERIM 1896-1899

The Anglo-German imbroglio in the early days of 1896 over the Transvaal had settled nothing definitely. The question of British predominance still hung fire. The Chartered Company's coup d'état had failed and by their victory the Boers were more firmly established in their dogged opposition than before. The Kruger Telegram confirmed them in this course, though the German retreat did little to warrant hope for direct help. If any good came out of the raid and its immediate consequences, it was only that England's position was clearly defined. Continental powers now knew, and Germany especially, that they could not trifle with England without running a great risk, and that if they provoked the island power beyond endurance they could not rely upon a continental alliance. On the other hand, Germany took cognizance of the situation and adjusted her actions accordingly.

The Jameson Raid and the Kruger Telegram came at a time when Anglo-German relations were none too friendly. Germany was provoked because of Britain's steady opposition to expansion, while England feared German commercial competition. The abrogation, in 1897, of the Anglo-German commercial treaty of 1865 further provoked Germany. The German advance in China created a new point of friction. The situation in Samoa, where England, Germany and the United States had established a tripartite rule, was becoming increasingly difficult. In South Africa the British Government attempted to obtain Delagoa Bay because of its value as a port and because of its strategic importance in the case of an Anglo-Boer struggle. This was certain to arouse German opposition.

January, 1896, was the beginning of those fateful years in which the idea took firm hold in England that Germany was her standing enemy.

However, neither government desired an Anglo-German rupture, and in March, 1898, Joseph Chamberlain, the Colonial Secretary, approached Berlin with the idea of an Anglo-German alliance. At last England had come to the place where the Wilhelmstrasse had wished to bring her. But Chamberlain's proposal envisaged an alliance to be directed primarily against Russia, for the colonial secretary considered Russian aspirations in the Far East most disturbing. This was counter to German wishes, for Russo-German relations were excellent. The German Government also doubted the sincerity of the offer, thinking that Great Britain wished to embroil Russia and Germany in order to fish unhindered in these troubled waters. Furthermore, a parliamentary government, based on a fickle electorate, assured little permanence to such an understanding. The offer was accordingly declined by the Wilhelmstrasse, which preferred to preserve a free hand in foreign affairs.

A general agreement having failed, attempts were made to come to an understanding over particular differences which might in turn initiate further negotiations for an alliance on terms more acceptable to Germany. In such a way the two powers came to an agreement over their respective positions in South Africa. It was anticipated that Portugal would soon be compelled to borrow money to replenish its depleted treasury. It was agreed that England and Germany would advance loans with the customs receipts of Mozambique, Angola and the Portuguese portion of Timor as security. The Convention that was drawn up in 1898 envisaged a division of these colonies between England and Germany for purposes of collecting the customs in the eventuality of a loan to the Portuguese Government. This arrangement also formed the basis for a territorial division should Portugal default on the anticipated loan. By the agreement England was to receive that part of Mozambique lying south of the Zambezi and Shire rivers, while the remainder of the province was assigned to Germany. In Angola, Germany was to receive a narrow strip of land in the north plus the southern half which adjoined German South West Africa. The intervening portion of Angola was assigned to England. A most important understanding, though it was not embodied in the text

of the Convention, stipulated that Germany would refrain from any intervention against England in regard to the Boers. In such a way the relation of the two powers over South Africa was definitely settled.

The Samoan dispute of 1898-1899 offered the second opportunity to settle particular differences between England and Germany. The negotiations have a relation to the present study only in so far as the outbreak of the Boer War in October, 1899, made England more amenable to Germany's demands in Samoa. After considerable wrangling Germany gained her point. The United States received Tutuila and Manua, England the Tonga Islands and islands in the Salamon group, while Germany received Upolu and Savaii.

The three and one half years following the Kruger Telegram saw a reorientation of Anglo-German relations to which the situation in South Africa contributed materially. The ill-feeling that had been engendered during the early days in 1896 subsided in part. Aside from the rivalry in South Africa, commercial rivalry and friction in the Far East and the South Pacific Islands increased the tension. Fear of Russia induced the London Cabinet, led in this by Joseph Chamberlain, to compose England's quarrel with Germany and if possible to make a defensive alliance with her. The Wilhelmstrasse declared that Germany did not feel called upon to fight English battles and declined the offer, awaiting the time when England would be still more pressed and thus obtain better terms. The treaty over the Portuguese Colonies was the first of a series of minor agreements between London and Berlin by which the German statesmen hoped to align England on the side of the Triple Alliance. In view of later developments the German Foreign Office was perhaps justified in its course, for Chamberlain had not yet given up hopes for an Anglo-German alliance. In addition, the treaty of 1898 definitely terminated German political aims in the Transvaal and left England free to carry out its scheme of federation, which in turn led to the Boer War. The second of the agreements was that over Samoa. It marked a German diplomatic victory over England largely because of the uncertainty of the German attitude toward Great Britain in the Anglo-Boer struggle. Generally speaking, the relation between the two governments was satisfactory during the closing days of the century, though the German press fulminated against the brutal attack of a land-hungry, corrupt England upon the sturdy, freedom-loving Boers.

CHAPTER IV
THE BOER WAR

Anglo-German Relations at the Beginning
of the Boer War

The long-expected struggle between Briton and Boer broke out in October, 1899. After futile attempts to improve the status of the Uitlanders by making it easier for them to obtain the franchise, both sides seemed convinced that the sword would be the only arbiter in this knotty question. It was a struggle to decide whether Great Britain or the South African Republic with its ally, the Orange Free State, would play the dominant rôle in South Africa.

The German Government's attitude towards the lowering war clouds over South Africa was in keeping with its pledges given at the time of the agreement concerning the Portuguese Colonies. Lascelles later testified that during the Boer War the German Government had never taken any hostile step. The unfortunate thing was that government and public opinion were not tuned to the same pitch. The latter sympathized generally with the Boers which the government had forsaken in 1898. The German people expected and desired the resumption of the policy which produced the Kruger Telegram. The ever increasing Anglophobia seriously compromised amicable relations between London and Berlin, and eventually helped to make permanent that mutual ill-will which induced the British Government to come to an understanding with the members of the Dual Alliance.

But public opinion could not induce the German Government to give up its neutrality. There were a number of weighty considerations which determined it in this course. In the first place, by the Anglo-German agreement over the Portuguese Colonies in South Africa, Germany had surrendered the Boers. Despite Bülow's assertion in the Reichstag that this Convention had nothing to do with German neutrality, it must be pointed out again that during the conversations leading to the agreement, the Germans had definitely pledged themselves not to interfere with British policy in Delagoa Bay and the Transvaal, though the Convention itself did not stipulate this condition. On the basis of this arrangement Germany could conveniently permit England to carry out its long cherished dream relative to the South African Republic, be-

cause she expected to win more than she surrendered. It was, therefore, no sacrifice on the part of the Germans when they promised neutrality upon the outbreak of the Boer War.

Furthermore, Germany's impotence in face of British opposition at the time of the Kruger Telegram was not forgotten. There was no desire in the Wilhelmstrasse to invite another such diplomatic fiasco. German public opinion undoubtedly clamored for an aggressive policy. But the Kaiser is reported as having said that intervention on the part of Germany could be likened to an attempt to stop a runaway horse with the waving of a handkerchief. As in the days of the Kruger Telegram, Germany now possessed no effective weapon wherewith to reach England. Even if the war should weaken Great Britain financially and in man-power, it would not affect the strength of the English navy. The early days of 1896 proved that Germany stood alone in regard to intervention against Britain. The international situation had not changed. It is true that France smarted under the diplomatic defeat which she had suffered at Fashoda. If Germany now hoped to capitalize on France's predicament to effect a rapprochement against England, she failed signally. Any such agreement would carry with it French acceptance of the status quo as established by the Treaty of Frankfurt. But Germany was still the arch enemy of France. "The Egyptian Sudan and the White Nile had not driven the thought of Metz and Strassburg from the hearts of the French." Were Germany to attempt intervention she would again stand alone as at the time of the Kruger Telegram. Russia also was not disposed to stir on behalf of the Boers. Thus in view of the international situation Germany was well advised to observe neutrality.

There was also an important reorientation of German policy in respect to German interests in the Transvaal. The Kruger Telegram had been sent, partly, for the ostensible purpose of safeguarding German capital in South Africa. The intervening years had witnessed that Anglo-German rapprochement in South Africa which terminated German political aspiration. In a letter to Hammann, September 9, 1898, Holstein pointed out that German capital was much more secure in Cape Colony than in the Transvaal because of the anarchy in the latter state. Why then, he asked, should Germany apply force to save the Boers from English domination, when her own countrymen would fare better under British rule? Eckardstein informed Chamberlain shortly before the out-

break of the Boer War, that all "sensible politicians in Germany as well as the capitalists look upon an absorption [sic] of the Transvaal by England as an historical and commercial necessity." An English victory and the annexation of the Transvaal were quite generally considered by responsible German leaders to be the best guarantee for German vested interests in South Africa.

The final consideration which determined the Wilhelmstrasse for neutrality pertained to the German navy. The first great naval program had been launched in 1897. A war with England at a time when the German fleet was by no means a match for British maritime strength, would have been ruinous to the Kaiser's navy. Moreover, the whole German merchant marine would have been at England's mercy. The only reasonable policy was the one upon which the German Government had decided.

The sympathy which the German papers tendered the Boers was hardly a genuine sympathy. It is true, there was that feeling which is natural when a giant attacks a dwarf. The race relationship between Boer and German which was played up with much effect was more a matter for argument than a heartfelt reality. The Germans knew very little about the Boers. The real reason for the manifestations of sympathy lay in the hatred for the English. The professions of sympathy varied directly with the degree of Anglophobia. "The true color of the love for the Boers is the hatred against the covetous, people-devouring (Völkerfressende) Albion," wrote Hans Delbrück, the editor of the Preussische Jahrbücher.

In spite of the rabid Anglophobes and their vituperations against England, the Kaiser and Bülow visited England in November, 1899, after the conclusion of the Samoan quarrel. This proved that the relation between the two governments was friendly. During the course of a number of interviews between the visitors and Chamberlain and Balfour, the question of an Anglo-German rapprochement, with the United States as a third partner, was raised by the colonial secretary. Upon the suggestion of Bülow, Chamberlain made a public statement to this effect on November 30, 1899, at Leicester. The reaction was unfavorable in the press of both countries, and when, in a speech on December 11, 1899, Bülow studiously avoided the issue raised by Chamberlain, and went no further than to declare that Germany wished amicable relations with England, the suggestion of the colonial secretary fell to

the ground. Germany still proceeded on the principle that an Anglo-German arrangement, directed against Russia, was undesirable. Time was in favor of Germany. The longer Germany postponed a rapprochement the better terms would she be able to procure from Great Britain. The ill-feeling that arose from this incident soon subsided and friendly relations were restored by Christmas of 1899.

The Seizure of German Mail Steamers

New vigor was added to the storm that had momentarily abated during the weeks just prior to Christmas, 1899, by the seizure of German mail steamers by British men-of-war. In the middle of December Salisbury had urged a systematic search for contraband of war with a view to cutting off supplies from the Boers. The advice was acted upon with telling effect by over-anxious officers, for within less than a fortnight, beginning with December 28, 1899, three German mail steamers, the "Bundesrath," the "General," and the "Herzog" were stopped on suspicion of carrying contraband of war. While the last two named ships were released soon after seizure, the "Bundesrath" was detained for upwards of three weeks.

In this incident the German Government and public opinion agreed. The act was denounced in the press most vehemently and the Wilhelmstrasse worded strong protests to the government at London. The distance from Durban, Natal, where the "Bundesrath" was held, to London was too great for speedy negotiations, and the longer the delay, the more provoking it became to Germany, especially so when the "Bundesrath" was subjected to a prize court. The German Government renewed its protests and referred to a similar case in the American Civil War, when an English ship, the "Springbok," had been subjected to a United States prize court. At that time the British Government had formulated the following principle:

"A vessel's destination should be considered neutral, if both the port, to which she is bound and every intermediate port, at which she is to call in the course of her voyage be neutral. . . . the destination of the vessel is conclusive as to the destination of the goods."

Inasmuch as the Transvaal had no port at all, the above ruling appeared applicable. However, Salisbury countered the

argument by declaring that the ruling was outmoded in view of modern warfare. The premier's tenacious attitude and the continued delay very nearly produced another serious situation when the Kaiser contemplated sending a special envoy to London to demand a satisfactory settlement within forty-eight hours. Only the timely release of the "Bundesrath" prevented such a procedure.

With the release of the "Bundesrath," the usual correct relations between Berlin and London were again established. However, the incident was again exploited by the German Government and the Pan-German League to win support for an extension of the first navy law. The Allgemeine Zeitung hoped that good might still come out of the lamentable mail steamer incident. It had taught the German people a lesson. Germany must possess a fleet strong enough to impose respect on the British, and to safeguard the commercial interests of the Fatherland.

The Question of a Continental Intervention Against England during the Boer War

From the beginning of the South African War there was danger from a continental alliance against England. Britain was without friends among the Great Powers. France was still smarting from the effects of Fashoda, and Russia was Great Britain's rival in Asia. The "Schadenfreude" of the German "Michel" was not limited to Germany. Both members of the Dual Alliance would have benefitted by the mistress of the seas being weakened. With Germany wedged in between them it would have been a dangerous policy on the part of France and Russia to undertake any drastic measures against England. However, a continental arrangement, with Germany as a partner, would force England to yield coveted territories. Whereas in 1896, at the time of the Kruger Telegram, the Kaiser had sounded for an alliance, in 1899 the suggestion proceeded from St. Petersburg and Paris. The reversal of the responsibility was due to Germany's reorientation of her policy towards England.

The proposals for intervention emanated from the capitals of the members of the Dual Alliance from the fall of 1899 to the fall of 1901. Inasmuch as the suggestions stipulated that Germany should take the initiative, it appears that the object was to embroil Germany with England. The purpose for this was twofold. In the first place, Russia and France deprecated the pros-

pect of an Anglo-German Alliance, and the best preventive measure for such an eventuality was to sow discord between the two countries. The repeated stories that French and Russian representatives at London told of supposed German intrigues against England, whereas in reality they originated in St. Petersburg and Paris, lend color to this interpretation. Furthermore, Russia desired to expand in Asia where British interests would be jeopardized. St. Petersburg knew that with a continental war against England the prospects for success would be practically assured, for then England would not be able to attend to her possessions in Asia.

However, the German Government could not be lured from its neutral policy towards England, and nothing came of the intervention. On the contrary, in the spring of 1901, the British Government again approached the Wilhelmstrasse for an alliance, which is proof that the relations between the two governments during this trying period were correct. But the German Government again invoked the well-known objections against an Anglo-German rapprochement. The hand that was refused now was not offered again, and Germany by this refusal aided considerably her own isolation.

The Bülow-Chamberlain Recriminations

The German hostility that resulted from the seizure of the three mail steamers soon spent its force. For more than a year the militant press attacks on England gave way to milder criticisms on both sides. During the latter part of the war, however, British methods of suppressing the Boers aroused wide-spread criticism, especially in Germany. Since the spring of 1900 it had become apparent that the Boers could not withstand the power of a mighty empire. Organized defense on the part of the Boers had given way to desultory warfare in which the Commandos roamed over large parts of South Africa, and were a continual annoyance and danger to the more slowly moving British forces. The British Concentration Camps into which old Boer men, women and children were crowded to prevent them from aiding the Commandos were described as manifestations of barbarism and vandalism. Where previously the victories of the Boers had been extolled, their sorry plight was now avenged by renewed attacks on England. Cartoons showed British soldiers bayonetting Boer babies and committing every imaginable atrocity. The British soldier, like the

English nation, was considered to be morally corrupt. Kitchener was thought to have earned several times over the unenviable appellation of "The Butcher of Omdurman."

The criticisms were indignantly refuted from the other side. It was shown in return how German methods in the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-1871 had been no more humane than those employed by the British forces in South Africa. Long passages of German army orders of 1870-1871 were quoted in vindication of the British contention. As a result German military pride was touched, and this brought forth an endless number of charges and countercharges.

The height of indignation and excitement was reached when Chamberlain, speaking at Edinburgh on October 25, 1901, in defending the government's policy against foreign attacks, stated that the methods employed by the British army in South Africa had not even approached the examples set in Poland, in the Caucasus, in America, in Tongking, in Bosnia, and in the Franco-Prussian war.

The speech was a bombshell to the already provoked and angered German nation. Unmindful of the fact that Chamberlain had made reference to the methods of warfare of all the Great Powers, the Germans, priding themselves on being a "nation in arms," took the remarks as a national insult. Chamberlain and the British army became more than ever the objects of much abuse and insult. Meetings of protest were held by University students and veterans of the Franco-Prussian War. The British army was described as the scum of all English classes. To compare it with the illustrious German army of 1870-1871 and its glorious victories was absurd. Pan-Germans burnt the colonial minister in effigy. Spittoons representing Chamberlain were profitably sold in the streets of Berlin. Liebermann von Sonnenberg, one of the most rabid Anglophobes, speaking in the Reichstag, referred to Chamberlain as the "verruchteste Bube der Gottes Erdboden schändet."

During this time there appeared in the Times a series of articles on German Anglophobia Literature which filled English public opinion with hatred against the Germans. It was a collection of the most obscene representations that had appeared throughout the Boer War. Simplicissimus, a Munich comic paper, at one time represented Queen Victoria as a drunken old marketwoman, with a whisky bottle by her side vainly trying to pluck an ostrich

feather. The Prince of Wales was shown comforting the widows of the fallen Boer soldiers. Soon after Queen Victoria's death King Edward VII was pictured dancing on the mutilated bodies of Boer women and children. Underneath the king was reported as saying: "The blood spurts so, it may stain my crown." Still other numbers showed Chamberlain as the devil and Kitchener as the butcher holding up in either hand a Boer head streaming with blood. The most shameful caricature of all represented Queen Victoria holding a court "conferring the Victoria Cross on a British soldier for having raped more Boer girls than anyone else of his age." That such ribaldry was countenanced in the "best" circles of Berlin seems to show more than anything else the measure of the intense antipathy that obtained in Germany at that time.

Bülow's public reply to Chamberlain's speech lacked his usual conciliatory note, for the German Government shared with the general public the disgust that the Edinburgh speech had engendered. The chancellor advised statesmen to avoid references to foreign countries in an attempt to justify their own policy. Bülow justified the indignation of the German people and concluded by pointing out that the record, achievement and moral discipline of the German army placed it far above reproach, and concurred with Frederick the Great's reply to a similar charge: "Let the man alone and don't excite yourselves, he is biting at granite."

These various Anglo-German crises: the Kruger Telegram, the disagreement over Samoa, the seizure of German mail steamers, and finally the Bülow-Chamberlain recriminations had their lasting effect, even though they were superficially composed. The Anglo-German negotiations for an alliance, though they had failed for reasons other than those arising out of the ill-feeling attaching to the Boer War, were definitely terminated by the most recent outburst of mutual disdain. Lord Lansdowne, who had replaced Salisbury at the foreign office in November, 1900, informed Metternich that "The temper of the two countries was not in a particularly favorable state" to resume negotiations with an Anglo-German rapprochement in view. In February, 1902, the British Government definitely ended its policy of "splendid isolation" by entering an alliance with Japan. While here again the Boer War can not be said to have been the main factor in determining the alliance, yet since the German doors were shut, and the re-

cent violent outburst of public opinion seemed to have locked them for an indefinite time, England turned to the Far East.

The Bülow-Chamberlain recriminations were also responsible, in part, for British leanings toward France. The oft-repeated threat, at which German statesmen had so frequently scoffed, that England would go over to the Dual Alliance, began to seem less idle. The National Review again urged an Anglo-French as well as an Anglo-German understanding. Eckardstein relates that at a dinner on February 8, 1902, he observed Chamberlain and Paul Cambon, the French Ambassador, in spirited conversation. Though he could not understand all that was said, he did hear the words "Morocco" and "Egypt." Immediately after this conversation Eckardstein approached Chamberlain who complained bitterly of the German attitude and particularly of Bülow's speech. Chamberlain declared that he had had quite enough of Bülow's highhandedness, and there was no possibility of an Anglo-German rapprochement. Whatever the subject of the Chamberlain-Cambon conversation may have been, Chamberlain apparently came away with sufficient hope of an Anglo-French understanding to warrant his unconciliatory observations. The Anglo-French policy which led to the German charge of "encirclement" had begun.

After the Peace of Vereeniging

The peace signed at Vereeniging on May 31, 1902, by Kitchener, Milner and the Boer delegates, Louis Botha and Schalk Burger, ended Boer independence. The Kaiser's congratulatory telegram to Edward VII upon the successful conclusion of the war was gratefully received. Bülow's laudatory comments to Lascelles on the splendid way in which the British soldiers, and the nation at large, had conducted themselves during those trying years of the war, were an obvious attempt to re-establish amicable relations. The German press, also, was less militant in its attacks on England.

There were definite attempts from both sides to check further bitterness. Field Marshal von Waldersee, the German chief-of-staff, had gone to England as the Kaiser's representative at the coronation of King Edward in June, 1902. Lord Salisbury, who had been the object of much vilification in Germany, seizing upon the favorable opportunity to show his conciliatory attitude, gave a dinner in honor of the German General. In response to the

toast tendered him Waldersee said:

"I thank you very much having given me the opportunity of meeting you all tonight. It is a great honour to me to take part in the present festivities for the coronation of His Majesty your most gracious King. The fact of having had the honour last year to command British troops, and to see for myself their good training and gallantry adds to my pleasure and satisfaction at being tonight the guest of so distinguished a commander-in-chief of the British army, the ever victorious field marshall as my host.

"We German soldiers all know very well how difficult and arduous the task was that the British army has had to accomplish in South Africa, we know also that the officers and men of your army have accomplished their task with utmost devotion to their country, with bravery and humanity.

"May I be allowed to propose the health of His Majesty the King and of the gallant British army."

The British Field Marshal, also, had nothing but praise for the German officers and the army, and all ill-feeling seems to have been forgotten. The occasion had a salutary effect on public opinion on both sides of the channel. Waldersee's praise for the English army offset the abuse that had been heaped on the British officers and soldiers in the German Reichstag and a large part of the press.

The last incident, relative to the Boer War, which ruffled Anglo-German relations was in regard to the anticipated visit to Germany of the three Boer Generals, Botha, Dewet and Delarey. In August 1902, they arrived in England where they were received cordially by King and people. From there they proceeded to the continent in the interest of their impoverished countrymen. All classes in Germany were anxious to see the gallant leaders of the Commandos, who for years had been the objects of their sympathies and the basis of their hopes. The Kaiser himself, unmindful of the possible consequences, was exceedingly impatient to interview them. English public opinion was thoroughly alarmed at the prospect of a meeting between the Generals and the Kaiser. The English press considered that it would be another interference, on the part of the German Government, in British domestic affairs, paralleling the Kruger Telegram. Several editors informed Eckardstein, first secretary in the German embassy at London, that in

case the Kaiser should permit such an interview there would be a new outburst of uncontrollable anger in England. Under such circumstances the Kaiser refrained from granting the Generals an audience. But this did not prevent their visit to Germany. On October 17, 1902, they were received with great enthusiasm at the hall of the Philharmonic. The Pan-German League proved itself especially solicitous for their cause and contributed 200,000 M. for purposes of aiding their distressed kinsmen in South Africa.

With this episode the long drawn-out quarrel between the English and German peoples over the Transvaal came to an end. Throughout this difficult period the governments of both countries strove to remain uninfluenced by public opinion and preserved generally correct, if not friendly, relations. But no government can ignore public opinion constantly, and statesmen on both sides, primarily however in Germany, felt themselves constrained on several occasions to yield in a small measure to the pressure brought to bear on them. In this ugly mêlée of charges and counter-charges the Germans were undoubtedly the losers, for England eventually succeeded in establishing her unquestioned hegemony in South Africa. Moreover, the Anglophobia precluded the resumption of negotiations for an Anglo-German alliance which, had it been effected, in all probability would have had a tempering effect on the general European situation.

CHAPTER V CONCLUSION

The ill feeling that was engendered between England and Germany over South African developments, 1895-1902, lay in the nature of the case. Germany was a late-comer in the field of colonial expansion and found that most of the valuable territory had already been appropriated by England and other colonial powers. When Germany's growing industry and commerce looked for territorial acquisitions, the greatest colonial power, Great Britain, checked their efforts to maintain her own relative position as a world power. This policy was keenly resented by a nation which was flushed with recent success in the wars of unification, and was the leading power on the Continent. The Germans did not understand why the English should begrudge them

acquisitions which were small in comparison to their huge possessions.

The first serious Anglo-German altercation developed out of the South African situation where both the German and the British imperialistic plans, with the Transvaal as the pivot, ran counter to each other. British success at crowding Germany out of every favorable vantage point which would have opened communication with the Boer Republic, filled a large part of the German public with venom against the insatiable greed of the island power. British methods, not always honorable, were denounced by a nation defeated in its purpose, but which did not scruple to resort to the same procedure in similar circumstances. German Anglophobia was in part the result of failure in colonial competition with a power which was considered by a majority of Germans as corrupt and demoralized.

On the other hand, the British people were equally proud of a glorious past. They felt painfully the commercial competition of the up-start empire in the heart of Europe. German colonial expansion would be nothing else than an increase of this pressure. Moreover, German activities in the Transvaal were considered an interference in British domestic affairs. The ruthless methods of German business men in the commercial world, but especially in the Transvaal, where they were aided and abetted by the Boers, were alarming. Great Britain saw herself forced to vigorous action to establish her undisputed hegemony in South Africa.

Both governments were desirous of preventing a rupture, and both gave repeated proof of the sincerity of this desire. Through a number of years Germany, by a policy of pin-pricks, hoped to align Great Britain on the side of the Triple Alliance. Anglo-German agreements over the Portuguese Colonies and Samoa were hoped to be the preliminary to a general understanding. The ill-feeling of the public on both sides did not prevent negotiations for an alliance. Mindful of England's precarious, isolated position among the powers in the event of difficulties, British statesmen proposed a rapprochement. Chamberlain, the sponsor of this proposal, undoubtedly foresaw the coming of the South African War. It was obvious that Germany as an ally would not interfere with British designs in Africa and at the same time would safeguard England from attacks by other powers. Germany's refusal to

the first offer did not prevent the British Government from making two more approaches during the Boer War.

Germany consistently refused the British advances because they feared an alliance directed against Russia. Moreover, German statesmen desired a strong fleet for which there would be no raison d'être in the eventuality of an alliance with the world's greatest naval power. The hatred for England, arising out of the situation in South Africa, was carefully exploited for purposes of gaining the necessary support to vote naval supplies. Then, also, there was no faith in the binding character of an alliance with a country whose government depended on the fickleness of an electorate. That the question of an Anglo-German alliance was not revived after the Boer War, as Chamberlain had desired, was due largely to the ever-increasing bitterness of public opinion on both sides, but especially in Germany. The various crises, the Jameson Raid and the Kruger Telegram, the seizure of the German mail steamers and the Bülow-Chamberlain recrimination at last had their telling effect. The British Government turned away in disgust from the halting Wilhelmstrasse and from the senseless raging of the German press to find alliances elsewhere. The Anglo-Japanese alliance, the Anglo-French entente and the Anglo-Russian understanding took the place of the often proposed Anglo-German alliance, which was made impossible by the Anglophobes in Germany. The Wilhelmstrasse had failed to take the flood that might have led on to peace and prosperity, and was compelled to see Great Britain come to terms with her avowed antagonists, France and Russia.

